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The study analyzes how the government of the Republic of Biafra used international norms to 
win foreign support during its 1967–1970 campaign to secede from Nigeria. Secession 
conflicts occur at the intersection of international and domestic politics. For independence 
movements, support from outside is crucial. But, as Bridget Coggins has asked, how can 
secession movements find “friends in high places”? International support for unilateral 
secession attempts is strictly prohibited. Domestic and international asymmetry are limiting 
secessionist foreign policy instruments to intangible means. Legitimacy is a central concept to 
illuminate the phenomenon. In international politics, legitimacy depends on the external 
perception of compliance with a canonical set of normative criteria. The international order 
prioritizes (1) territorial integrity, (2) nonintervention, and (3) uti possidetis over (4) national 
self-determination, (5) human rights, and (6) good governance. All six principles are 
contested. Secession movements can make use of this normative ambivalence to justify their 
claim in relation to the international community. They can use international norms 
strategically to influence the perceptions of foreign actors about the legitimacy of the 
secession claim to win external support. This concept is used to analyze the Biafran campaign 
for independence from Nigeria from 1967 to 1970. The inquiry rests on a combination of 
inductive and deductive research techniques and analyzes original documents such as official 




The United Nations headquarters in New York is one of the most prominent architectural 
symbols of international politics after World War II. In front of the Secretariat Building, the 
flag of every UN member state waves over the UN Plaza. Every time the United Nations 
accepts a new member, it adds a new national flag to the row of flagpoles in a special flag-
raising ceremony.1 At the official opening of the headquarters building in 1951, only sixty 
flags flew at the site. By then, the architects already expected membership growth and 
installed thirty more flagpoles for future admissions.2 Only nine years later, the number of 
member states had grown to ninety-nine.3 In December 1960, the UN General Assembly 
declared in its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”4 
For many peoples, fulfilling this right means one thing: establishing an independent, 
sovereign state.5 UN admission is by far the clearest sign of independence and sovereignty in 
the modern international system. As the symbolism at the UN Plaza demonstrates, the 
emergence of new states is a dynamic process. The number of UN member states has now 
grown to 193.6 This “trend,” as Tanisha Fazal and Ryan Griffiths have called it, continues.7  
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South Sudan, the United Nation’s newest member, became independent from Sudan in 2011.8 
As in South Sudan, most sovereign states belonged to larger countries before their 
independence. Often, the flag-hoisting ceremony in New York was the pinnacle of a long 
political struggle. More often, however, struggles for independence ended tragically.9  
The area surrounding the UN building is a magnifying glass for the ups and downs of 
state emergence. It is not only a place for celebration but also one for protest and grief. 
Supported by friends from the United States, representatives of the unrecognized Republic of 
Biafra, for example, in 1968 and 1969 repeatedly held protest rallies at the Dag 
Hammarskjöld Plaza, a park near the UN Headquarters. With their national flag waving above 
their heads, the Biafrans appealed to the United Nations to work toward peace in their bloody 
conflict with the Nigerian central state and help them in their struggle for independence. To 
their disappointment, neither the General Assembly nor General Secretary U Thant 
responded.10 
While the United Nations and its members support national self-determination in 
principle, they are cautious of encouraging people within existing countries to aim for 
independent statehood. Instead, they desire the sovereignty of existing states and the 
preservation of the territorial status quo in international politics.11 The rapid increase in the 
number of states during the 1960s was possible only because the former colonial states 
realized the illegitimacy of colonialism in international politics and voluntarily granted their 
former colonies independence. For a brief period, the international community took the 
principle of national self-determination as an explicit right to independent statehood. Its 
scope, however, was restricted to former colonies. For peoples whose boundaries were not 
congruent with colonial demarcations, the international community did not regard the claim to 
self-determination as sufficient cause to justify independent statehood.12 An all too 
welcoming attitude, statesmen feared, would initiate a contagious spread of minority demands 
that would eventually lead to a “balkanization” of states and the disruption of the international 
order.13 
Still, groups within existing states claim independence, though they are not entitled to the 
restrictive reading of self-determination.14 When such a claim to independence is accepted 
neither by the state of which the people in question is a part, the metropolitan state, nor by the 
international community, we speak of unilateral secession.15 The driving force behind a 
secession attempt is called secessionism. It is a political course of action that is mostly, but 
not always, carried out in the name of a distinct ethnic community.16 Secessionist movements, 
the agents of secessionism,17 claim a certain territory, often perceived as a homeland, and aim 
to withdraw it from the “authority of a larger state of which it is a part.”18 The restriction of 
metropolitan control over the territory in question is the foundation for the establishment of an 
independent state.19 To safeguard the independence of their state, secessionists seek 
international diplomatic recognition.20 
Experiences of discrimination, trigger events that threaten their survival, and in-group 
dynamics but also situations of metropolitan weakness are important forces that bring ethnic 
groups to desire secession, even if their chances are bleak.21 Metropoles normally reject 
secession claims straightaway.22 Because both actors claim exclusive control over the same 
territory, secession conflicts swiftly reach a deadlock and are often fought with much zeal.23 
Secession is exceptionally difficult to achieve but not impossible.24 According to John Wood, 
we should understand secession as a dynamic process. Secessionist movements need to apply 
a bundle of different strategies and interact with a variety of actors at several levels to reach 
their goal.25 
For secessionist movements, support from outside is crucial. Foreign support is necessary 
to reverse domestic asymmetry because the metropole is often a superior opponent. Secession 
movements also need diplomatic recognition to establish an independent state.26 Thus, 
secession conflicts are internationalized conflicts.27 But support from “friends in high places,” 




as Bridget Coggins has called them,28 does not come from nothing. At the international level, 
the domestic asymmetry continues. Because of the potentially disrupting consequences for the 
metropolitan state in question as well as for the international order itself, the handling of 
secessionist demands is a delicate matter for third states.29 Intervening on behalf of 
secessionists is a strict “taboo.”30 This prohibition also applies to premature recognition 
without metropolitan consent.31 As Eiki Berg states, “international law does not have a 
logically consistent legal doctrine that would treat sovereignty claims in a universal 
manner.”32 Consequently, whether to support or recognize a secessionist movement is an 
individual political decision made by sovereign states based on their interests and not an 
automatism.33 Sovereign states, however, are initially reluctant to support secession 
movements and instead treat them as nonstate actors. Because of this twofold asymmetry, 
secessionist instruments to find foreign support are often limited to intangible means. Thus, 
secessionist movements need to persuade foreign actors to support them.34 
At the same time, the international community’s handling of secessionist demands is 
constantly changing.35 The rapid increase in the number of states is a clear sign that the 
international territorial order is dynamic and in flux.36 Shifting notions of justice and 
appropriateness in international politics influence the willingness of states to accept or 
promote territorial changes.37 The secession practice is not regulated exclusively by restrictive 
principles such as the preservation of territorial integrity, the ban on foreign intervention, and 
uti possidetis, a regulation that restricts the right to state emergence to former colonies and 
first-order substates. Although hedged since the 1960s, national self-determination is still a 
central principle in international politics. Moreover, notions that condition sovereignty on 
certain behavior such as the protection of individual human rights, genocide prevention, 
democracy, and good governance increasingly influence the discourse on secession.38 
We know that secessionist movements justify their cause in relation to the international 
community.39 What we barely know is how secessionists do so strategically. International 
norms that tend to revise the territorial status quo might have a strategic value for secessionist 
movements when it comes to finding foreign friends. To zoom into this neglected type of 
secessionist action and shed light on the nexus of secessionist strategy, international norm 
dynamics, and foreign interference, this article explores the following research question: How 
do secessionist movements use international norms to win external support? I analyze a 
historical case that has rarely been considered in recent secession research: the Biafran 
campaign for independence from Nigeria, 1967 to 1970. 
According to Alexis Heraclides, secession movements seek to “meet international 
normative standards of legitimacy” as part of their international activities.40 Janice Mueller 
has investigated how the Tamil Liberation Army and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
“echoed” human rights to improve their strategic positions in the intrastate conflict.41 Lee 
Seymour has shown how the Kosovo government strategically invoked human rights to 
secure premature recognition after the declaration of independence in 2008.42 Alan Kuperman 
has investigated how the KLA has manipulated the international perception of the Kosovo 
conflict to prompt the international community to intervene.43 Coggins has introduced the 
concept of rebel diplomacy that pinpoints the “strategic use of talk” violent nonstate actors 
exert to acquire political goals.44 Fazal has illuminated how violent rebels make sure to adhere 
to the international law of war to display their behavior as legitimate.45 Matt Qvortrup has 
investigated the strategic calculus underlying independence referenda and how certain 
technical conditions influence international perceptions of their legitimacy.46 According to 
Fiona McConnell, Terri Moreau, and Jason Dittmer, secession movements (as well as other 
nonstate actors) “imitate” official state diplomacy when they interact with the international 
community to enhance their legitimacy and become recognized as equivalent actors.47 
Legitimacy is a sensible starting point for the analysis. What we are looking for also 
seems to have something to do with communicative actions as well as perceptional factors. As 




we have seen, international law does not entail any automatism for sovereign states to support 
secessionist movements. But normative ambiguities inherent in the international territorial 
order might offer “incentives”48 for secessionist movements to use international norms as 
strategic means to circumvent the metropolitan obstruction and bring sovereign states to 
intervene. To seize the phenomenon, I introduce the notion of secessionist norm politics, a 
concept inspired both by Bernd Bucher’s work in the subfield of critical constructivism within 
the discipline of international relations49 and the theory of legitimacy management in the 
sociology of organizations.50 
The Biafran case seems fruitful to illuminate the research problem because it has been 
one of the earliest instances of highly internationalized and mediatized intrastate conflict.51 At 
the time, the conflict was referred to as a “war of words.”52 Although well documented, the 
conflict is quite unknown in recent secession research. More recently, historians have 
carefully examined the conflict and highlighted the extensive international debate on 
questions of human rights and genocide it sparked.53 The period under investigation begins 
with the declaration of independence in May 1967 and ends with the capitulation of Biafra in 
January 1970. The study analyzes original documents such as official publications from the 
government of Biafra and press releases issued by its own public relations agency, Markpress. 
The analysis begins by introducing a strategic perspective to the notion of international 
legitimacy and develops a tentative concept of secessionist norm politics that makes it 
possible to discover secessionist norm use. The analysis then works out international and 
domestic context factors of the Biafran independence conflict. Finally, it investigates the 
Biafran strategy to win international support and how it unfolded. This investigation considers 
the conflict in three phases and ends by drawing conclusions that refine the theoretical 
concept. 
 
Norms and Legitimacy: A Strategic Perspective 
Circumventing domestic obstruction and persuading states to breach the secession taboo is a 
strategic imperative for secessionist movements. Because of domestic and international 
asymmetry, foreign policy instruments of secession movements are limited to intangible, 
ideational, or cognitive means.54 
The straightforward concept of legitimacy management in the sociology of organizations 
can help us uncover strategies that rest on the use of normative means. Mark Suchman offers 
a basic definition of legitimacy: the “perception that the actions of an entity are appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms.”55 An audience attributes legitimacy. 
Audience members base their decision to legitimize an actor on the evaluation of its 
compliance with specific legitimacy criteria. These criteria are identical with norms that have 
a high social resonance within the audience. Legitimation has profound consequences because 
it enables actors to act unhindered and often secures them active support by legitimizing 
actors.56 
For this reason, organizations seek to manage their legitimacy by influencing the 
perceptions of external actors. To gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy, organizations can 
openly adjust their behavior to the norms that are relevant to the audience they want to 
convince.57 Or they can manipulate the perceptions of their target audience by building 
“legitimacy facades.”58 Both varieties rest on the use of norms. Since legitimacy is a matter of 
perception, legitimacy management occurs mainly in such areas as mass media or public 
relations.59 Legitimacy management then is an intangible and indirect strategy to win external 
support by using the norms that resonate within a community of potential supporters. The 
norms that legitimacy managers use are essentially strategic means. 
To capture agency in norm dynamics, Bucher has introduced the promising concept of 
international norm politics, illuminating “processes of norm articulation, propagation, 




contestation, adaption, adoption, and rejection.”60 The proposed research agenda focuses on 
“agents embedded within social arrangements and how their purposeful actions lead to the 
unintended social construction of reality.”61 Actors that pursue norm politics exercise power 
by deploying, evoking, or using symbolic “normative, or judicial resources to directly alter 
what other international actors do.”62 The approach incorporates the classic definition of 
international norms as “standards of appropriate behavior.”63 
In international law, secession is somewhat unregulated and commonly deemed a matter 
of domestic politics outside the scope of international jurisdiction. For fears of encouraging 
minorities and setting disrupting precedents, states refrain from formulating clear-cut rules for 
legitimate secession. Despite the clear preference for territorial integrity, nonintervention, and 
uti possidetis, the competing notion of national self-determination is still a highly important 
principle in international law. Moreover, notions that tend to “relativize sovereignty,”64 such 
as individual human rights, genocide prevention, and good governance, increasingly penetrate 
the secession discourse. This “pouring in” of norms, which were not originally part of the 
normative framework regarding state emergence, is the result of a trend in international 
politics toward greater respect for humanitarian concerns.65 We can now observe a 
“simultaneity” of contradicting and contested principles.66 
Secession conflicts occur in an international environment that is regulated by a mesh of 
six norms: (1) territorial integrity, (2) nonintervention, and (3) uti possidetis, (4) national self-
determination, (5) human rights/genocide, and (6) good governance. They tend to prompt 
either the preservation of the current territorial status quo (1–3) or its revision (4–6).67 While 
the status-quo oriented norms are based on the conservative paradigm of state sovereignty, the 
revisionist norms can be associated with a broader dynamic toward liberal internationalism. 
Although the status quo principles are prioritized in theory and practice, all six norms share 
some ambivalences and controversies, especially if one tries to balance them. Thus, some 
norms concerning secession and statehood clash in certain situations.68 
I suppose that the normative ambiguities and dynamics inherent in the territorial order 
might offer possible access points for secessionist norm use at the international level. For 
secession movements, as depicted by Rafael Biermann, international norms not only are 
neutral rules of the game but appear as “legitimation device[s]” that they interpret selectively 
and put forward to pursue their interests.69 International norms are strategic means for 
secessionist movements to win international support. Secessionist movements use the societal 
resonance of international norms and connect the internal conflict to international norm 
dynamics to bring states to “do something [they] would not otherwise do”70: break the 
secession taboo and interfere in the secession conflict on behalf of the secessionist movement. 
Summing up the theoretical considerations, I propose the following theoretical concept: 
Secessionist norm politics encompass the strategic use of international norms to influence the 
perceptions of foreign actors about the legitimacy of the secession claim to win external 
support. 
Following Heraclides, I incorporate a rather broad understanding of international support 
as an action: “(1) . . . that was deliberately aimed at supporting the position of the 
secessionists; (2) . . . enhanced the secessionist position, irrespective of the state’s intention; 
and (3) defined by the secessionists themselves . . . as helpful.”71 Foreign support includes 
intangible measures such as verbal acknowledgment and diplomatic advocacy but also 
tangible forms such as military aid and military intervention.72 Formal diplomatic recognition 
is another highly valuable form of outside support since it can open the door for a dynamic 
spread of foreign assistance, as Coggins has stated.73 
With those tentative ideas about secession movements and their use of international 
norms in mind, we can proceed to the analysis. 
 




The Case of Biafra 
The International and Regional Context: Norms and Politics in the Global Sixties 
The Biafran secession conflict erupted right after the heyday of national self-determination 
during decolonization.74 Once most of the former colonies successfully achieved 
independence during the 1960s, the international community quickly began to “domesticate”75 
the principle. To prevent a chaotic break-up of old and new states, and to safeguard 
international stability during the cold war, all major and regional powers went back to 
privileging the competing norms of territorial integrity and nonintervention.76 To regulate 
decolonization, the international community imposed a “colonial grid” on the new states, as 
Christopher Clapham has put it.77 This practice involved a takeover of colonial administrative 
boundaries as state borders and referred to the ancient principle of interstate conduct uti 
possidetis.78 In consequence, the application of national self-determination as a right to 
emerge “as a sovereign independent state” was restricted to “territories . . . of the colonial 
type,”79 as General Assembly Resolution 1541 of December 1960 affirmed. For distinct 
groups within the newly established states, the self-determination should mean substate 
autonomy.80 This development led to a highly ambivalent situation as the principle of national 
self-determination was theoretically affirmed and practically contained at the same time.81 
The period was also a decade of political turmoil in many parts of the world, often 
subsumed under the term the global sixties.82 Nonstate actors increasingly influenced 
international politics. The desire for a revolutionary change in the Western World connected 
with a growing awareness of colonial and postcolonial matters. The Vietnam War and its 
immersive international media coverage catalyzed this dynamic.83 Influenced by the cold war 
dualism between liberal democracy and state socialism, the question of development loomed 
over large parts of the postcolonial world and increasingly aroused Western societies.84 The 
rise of mass media and the beginnings of a culture of Holocaust remembrance in Western 
Europe further contributed to this profound transformation.85 While the notion of national 
self-determination temporarily lost its momentum, human rights and genocide, ideas that 
originated in the postwar years but gained prominence in the course of decolonization, 
became central normative reference points for an emerging international civil society.86 To 
celebrate the breakthrough of international humanitarianism, UNESCO declared 1968 the 
International Year of Human Rights.87 
 
Domestic Determinants of the Biafran Secession 
The Biafran independence conflict was rooted in a complex combination of colonial heritage, 
state weakness, identity politics, and communal violence. Nigeria became independent from 
Britain in 1960. Like most postcolonial states, it inherited the boundaries of the former 
colonial administration. Typically for British colonial politics, the inner and outer boundaries 
were determined arbitrarily, with complete disregard for the enormous social diversity of the 
vast territory.88 After independence, the country was demarcated by three federal units, 
roughly modeled on the settlement patterns of the dominant ethnic groups: the Muslim Hausa-
Fulani in the north, the Christian Igbo in the east, and the Yoruba in the southwest. Since the 
political system deliberately restricted the power of the federal state, the substates had many 
opportunities for separate development. By the mid-1960s, they already diverged 
significantly.89 
Latent interethnic tensions came to the fore when two failed coups d’état triggered a 
federal crisis in 1966. The federal government presented the events as acts of the Igbo and 
accused the group of plotting for a takeover. Spurred on by these reproaches, local unrest in 
the Northern Region escalated into mob violence against Igbo residents that killed about thirty 
thousand people. Shocked by the events, the Eastern administration, which had to deal with a 




wave of Igbo refugees that had fled the North, demanded increased autonomy and further 
political devolution of the federation. A series of failed negotiation attempts and a federal 
decree that suspended the political autonomy of all substates triggered the Eastern 
administration to declare secession in May 1967. To reintegrate the Eastern Region and 
prevent other regions from seceding, the federal army began a military campaign in July.90 
The conflict went through three stages: (1) a military stalemate that lasted from June 1967 to 
spring 1968; (2) guerilla warfare caused by a federal blockade till spring 1969; and (3) a 
federal offensive that ceased with the Biafran capitulation in January 1970.91 
 
Introducing Biafra: Spring 1967–Spring 1968 
On the morning of Tuesday, May 30, 1967, military governor Odumegwu Ojukwu officially 
declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra. Several national and international media 
correspondents attended the event. During the ceremony, Ojuwku presented the new national 
flag, which consisted of three horizontal squares in red, black, and green with a yellow 
pictogram of a rising sun in its center, a design inspired by the Pan-African flag.92 Like many 
other documents of this kind,93 the Biafran Proclamation of Independence was heavily 
inspired by the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. According to the Biafran 
version, the Biafrans had “certain inalienable rights” that could “no longer be protected . . . by 
any Government based outside Eastern Nigeria.”94 
During the following months, the Biafran attention was drawn to tasks such as internal 
mobilization and warfare.95 “Introducing the Republic of Biafra,” as one leaflet, published in 
Europe during the period, stated in its title, was the primary aim of the Biafran campaign at 
the international level. The publication portrays the Biafran secession as a consequence of 
decolonization and the breakup of the “artificial geographical unit” Nigeria.96 Biafra, the 
document declares, “opted for self-determination after a long period of heart-searching and 
after making desperate efforts to save the Federation of Nigeria from disintegration.”97 
According to the publication, the Biafrans had a historical and cultural “uniqueness” that 
made them distinct from other Nigerian ethnicities.98 From the beginning of the conflict, the 
Biafran government acted as if Biafra were already a fully independent state. In White Paper 
on Future Association, published internationally in August 1967, the government affirmed the 
sovereignty of the new republic, portrayed the Biafran secession as a result of the break-up of 
Nigeria, and even offered the federal state cooperative relations.99  
The international community, however, largely ignored the conflict.100 In July 1967, the 
US magazine Jet described it as “the war between blacks nobody cares about.”101 Unlike the 
United States, which firmly ruled out any premature recognition already in June,102 most 
states did not even concern themselves with the issue. In September, the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) deemed the conflict an “internal affair, the solution of which is 
primarily the responsibility of the Nigerians itself.”103 Asked by a journalist for the Canadian 
position on the Biafran war, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau answered in early 1968: “Where’s 
Biafra?”104 
Two significant developments throughout winter 1967/68 forced the Biafran government 
to review and intensify its international activities: First, thanks to its material might and 
British reinforcements, the federal army was able to gain the upper hand on the battlefield and 
conquer large areas of the Biafran territory. The federal military also succeeded in 
establishing a blockade around the area that effectively isolated Biafra and its population of 
fourteen million people from the outside world. As a consequence, Biafra ran short of 
medicines, seeds, and food.105 Second, shocked by the increasingly problematic humanitarian 
situation in the area, relief workers and church representatives who had visited Biafra began 
to express their concerns in the international media.106 In October, Pope Paul VI published his 
pamphlet On Africa, in which he calls on Christians on the continent to step in “when 
violence, as has unfortunately happened, assumes almost the proportions of genocide, when 




within the boundaries of the same country different racial groups are pitted against one 
another.”107 Ojukwu realized the strategic value of this new international attention as he 
declared in his Christmas broadcast “The Vision of Biafra” in December 1967: “The world is 
beginning to see the justness of our cause.”108 
  
Fight for Survival: Spring 1968–Spring 1969 
As the prospects of a military victory vanished, the Biafran government and its Ministry of 
Information radically intensified their attempts to internationalize the conflict. Essential for 
the new strategy was the foundation of the international public relations agency Markpress 
News Feature Service – Biafran Overseas Press Division in January 1968. Run by the British 
media expert William Bernhardt, the professional enterprise took offices in Geneva, 
Switzerland. According to Morris Davis, the Markpress mailing list contained more than four 
thousand addressees, including all members of the British Parliament, most major 
newspapers, news agencies, and several civil society organizations.109 Key publications 
included the periodical Biafra Newsletter and a significant number of professional press 
releases, of which Markpress issued several hundred within just two years.110 
The Biafran publications contained current news from the front, commentaries of recent 
international events, reports of federal atrocities, speeches by Biafran officials, minutes of 
press conferences, and press reviews with comments favorable toward Biafra. Markpress also 
published comprehensive volumes of programmatic statements and documents by the Biafran 
government.111 The public relations agency worked closely with the Biafran government and 
received information by Telex almost daily. Usually, the media experts transformed the 
Biafran telegrams into proper press releases without editing them much, as Bernhardt told the 
BBC in 1968.112 Also, the service managed to fly foreign journalists into the enclave. 
According to Davis, the typical press tour consisted of a round of press conferences and talks 
with the Biafran government. After that, the foreign journalists had a chance to visit the 
countryside, refugee camps, and the conflict-zone.113 Markpress, in turn, issued minutes and 
reports of the events.114 Thus, Markpress became Biafra’s central “means of communication 
[to the] outside world,” as Bernhard states in a letter addressed to “Editors Receiving 
Markpress Releases.”115 In another letter, addressed to the “Editors of the German Press List,” 
Bernhardt reveals the calculus of his endeavors: “Maximum coverage.”116 
During a press conference in spring 1968, Ojukwu reflected on the new strategy: “The 
war aims of Biafra are very simple: to delay the enemy for as long as possible until world 
conscience is aroused and then to seek world support in what is essentially a human 
problem.”117 The strategy, he said, aimed at influencing “world opinion.”118 In another press 
release, Ojukwu declared that he hoped the new strategy would inspire Western governments 
to “seriously re-examine their position in the war against Biafra.”119 “Public opinion,” 
Ntieyong Akpan, chief of staff under Ojukwu, recalled of the Biafran approach in his 
memoirs, “would force . . . governments to take positive action in favor of Biafra.”120 He 
further stated: “The longer the war lasted, the more sympathy Biafra would have from the 
world. Such sympathy might bring more recognition, thus making it possible for Biafra to 
survive as an independent entity from the rest of Nigeria.”121 Winning international support 
now was a top priority for the Biafrans. 
Markpress, with the Ministry of Information, also ensured that the Biafran publications 
contained a comprehensive wording. Rather than speaking of a struggle of an African people 
for self-determination, the Biafrans began to display the conflict as a “War of Survival.”122 
Genocide and human rights became the central normative reference points for the new 
strategy, allowing the Biafrans to pick up on an interpretation of the conflict that eyewitnesses 
had put forward during fall 1967.123 According to Roy Doron, who has investigated the 
Biafran government’s strategy to mobilize internal support beginning in early 1968, the 




people of Biafra were sure that a genocide impended.124 In a rather eclectic fashion, the 
Biafrans referred to sources of international law such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Geneva Convention, the UN Year of Human Rights, and the Genocide 
Convention.125 The following passage from a pamphlet titled Genocide Breaks up Nations, 
issued by the Ministry of Information, shows this concern clearly: “In this era of human rights 
and competing social systems, it must be regarded as a fundamental law of politics that 
genocide will always result in the creation of a new state for the protection of the victims of 
this most abominable of all crimes.”126 Reflecting on the reluctant role of the OAU, the 
pamphlet further states: “Those African leaders who are opposed to self-determination for 
Biafrans are actually aiding and abetting genocide.”127 
To verify these accusations, the Biafrans and Markpress presented plenty of evidence. 
Throughout the conflict, the Biafrans repeatedly recalled the pogroms of 1966 as examples of 
the federal desire to exterminate the Biafran people.128 As the fighting intensified in early 
summer 1968, the federal war campaign delivered even more proof. Usually, Markpress 
issued detailed descriptions of atrocities, often backed up by eyewitness reports. Among the 
reported incidents were air raids on nonmilitary facilities, such as hospitals and markets, 
forced displacement of civilians, and the poisoning of humanitarian relief supplies.129 
Markpress also extensively covered the blockade and its effects on civilians.130 To validate 
the allegations, Markpress invited photojournalists to its press tours. During those trips, 
journalists experienced the human catastrophe firsthand and covered it extensively.131 Naked, 
miserable, and malnourished children became central motives.132 
Humanitarian relief was high on the Biafran wish list from the very beginning.133 In 
response to the tense humanitarian situation and the worsening of the food crisis, Christopher 
Mojekwu, Biafran minister for home affairs, issued a statement demanding “action and not 
words while such large numbers of people are suffering starvation and imminent death.”134 
During an international press conference, Ojukwu stated: “Every nation has a moral duty to 
help Biafrans defend themselves.”135 In a message sent to the president of the UN General 
Assembly, the Biafran government asked the assembly to “avail itself immediately of article 8 
of the Genocide Convention to take such action under the charter as they consider appropriate 
for the prevention, and suppression of acts of genocide.”136 To reverse the military 
asymmetry, the Biafrans repeatedly demanded a weapons embargo on Nigeria.137 
Calls for support also included pleas for more direct forms of “intervention.”138 These 
actions should lever the federal government to accept a cease-fire and encompass “efforts to 
bringing pressure to bear on [Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu] Gowon and to make him get down 
to a conference table.”139 Those appeals also included calls for the OAU to intensify its 
mediation efforts and toward the UN to put the conflict on the agenda of the General 
Assembly to work toward a cease-fire.140 According to the Biafran government, secession was 
the last resort to prevent a “final solution.”141 “Sovereignty,” Ojukwu declared, “is the only 
possible way of ensuring the Biafrans have exclusive control of the protection of their own 
lives, liberty, and prosperity.”142 A high-ranking Biafran official demanded in a speech: “Give 
Biafra diplomatic recognition and save 14 million Africans from extinction.”143 For the 
Biafran government, diplomatic recognition mattered not only because it reflected “political 
realities,” as Ojukwu contemplated. Widespread recognition would be “one way of getting the 
other side around the conference table.”144 The idea was that a ceasefire and negotiations 
would pave the way for an independence referendum and the deployment of an international 
peacekeeping force.145 
In April, the Biafran campaign obtained its first breakthrough with the diplomatic 
recognition by Tanzania. In the official statement, the Tanzanian government under President 
Julius Nyerere, justified the step with humanitarian concerns and a comparison that fitted the 
Biafran genocide narrative: “The Biafrans have now suffered the same kind of rejection 
within their state that the Jews of Germany experienced. Fortunately, they already had a 




homeland. They have retreated to it for their own protection, and for the same reason—after 
all other efforts had failed—they have declared it to be an independent state. In light of these 
circumstances, Tanzania feels obliged to recognize the setback of African Unity which has 
occurred.”146 Biafra reacted with great enthusiasm. The Biafra Sun, Biafra’s leading 
newspaper, enthusiastically praised Nyerere’s “historic statement.”147 Ojukwu declared 
afterward: “I think that Tanzania having, as it were, broken the ice, the true feeling of Africa 
will now be demonstrated.”148 The conflict, Ojukwu further declared, “has ceased to be an 
internal problem of Nigeria.”149 In May, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Zambia recognized 
Biafra as a sovereign state.150 All four states regarded the act as an exceptional decision and 
justified it with humanitarian concerns.151 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, president of the Ivory 
Coast, declared at a press conference in Paris: “Unity is for the living, not the dead.”152 This 
wave of premature recognition boosted the Biafran morale greatly, as Akpan recalled.153 “We 
have no doubt,” Ojukwu stated in July, “that Continental Europe will soon follow the lead of 
our friends in Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia in according Biafra the right to 
existence.”154 
As the Biafran government predicted, diplomatic recognition helped to persuade the 
OAU to mediate between the conflict parties. The talks in Kampala, Uganda, however, failed 
after only five days because neither side was willing to compromise.155 But the Biafran 
delegation took the chance to present its allegations at a high-level regional forum. In his 
speech, the Biafran delegate Louis Mbanefo compared the conflict to the Holocaust and 
praised the “support . . . by a number of African states which have recognized the sovereignty 
of Biafra.”156 Afterward, the Biafran government called out the federal government for its 
dishonest attitude during the conference.157 As Akpan later admitted, “the strategy . . .  was to 
do more to obtain additional diplomatic recognition than for successful peace negotiations.”158 
Soon after the first press visits, international mass media began to publish reports from 
the area. Major tabloids such as the German Stern and Life magazine illustrated their stories 
with drastic pictures of malnourished children.159 Most articles adopted Biafran wordings. 
Time correspondents James Wilde and Friedel Ungeheuer, for example, wrote in their lengthy 
report: “The Ibos are convinced that they are fighting not only for independence but for their 
survival as a people.”160 The German Spiegel issue of August 19, 1968, features a picture of 
naked Biafrans on its front page, accompanied by the headline: “Biafra. Death Sentence for a 
People.”161 According to Lasse Heerten, the conflict had become an “international media 
event.”162 Markpress and the Biafran government were well aware of their media impact and 
tried to harness the international arousal, as press releases with news clippings prove.163 
In June, the representative of the Republic of Biafra in New York issued a press release 
in which he insisted that “Individuals and Voluntary Organisations in America and Britain 
should now organize pressure groups to force their home governments to bring the 
Nigeria/Biafra war which they are sponsoring in favour of Nigeria to an end.”164 This “Biafra 
lobby,” as one British journalist has called it,165 consisted of civil society organizations such 
as the Aktion Biafra-Hilfe in Germany, the Britain-Biafra Association, and the American 
Committee to Keep Biafra Alive.166 Geoffrey Birch and Dominic St. George from the Britain-
Biafra Association, for example, wrote in their pamphlet Biafra—The Case for Independence: 
“World opinion must demand that the Lagos Government withdraw their troops from Biafra, 
accept this new nation’s existence and be prepared to negotiate the closest form of economic 
union possible after the bloodshed. Public opinion should not hesitate to make it known that 
where human lives are being lost in their thousands, humanity must take precedence over 
diplomatic niceties and superficial self-interest.”167 The Aktion Biafra-Hilfe urgently 
demanded an “effective German contribution to the prevention of this biggest genocide since 
the annihilation of the Jews.”168 
As Ruth Bowert from the Zentrale der Aktions-Kommittees Biafra/Sudan stated in an 
interview with the German Spiegel, the unions were in close contact with the Biafran 




government and aimed at “combining humanitarian relief with political action.”169 They 
organized rallies, published periodicals with material about the conflict, and collected 
donations.170 Markpress, in turn, circulated Biafra Union materials and covered their 
events.171 Activists included people from the Biafran diaspora, but also journalists, relief 
workers, Christians, and radical students concerned with Third World issues. This way, a 
dense and very active transnational network emerged that helped to spread the Biafran 
message and pressurized Western governments to support the secessionist republic.172 
In July, the French Council of Ministers insisted, “The present conflict should be solved 
on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination.”173 A few weeks later, President 
Charles de Gaulle confirmed this position and brought forward humanitarian considerations. 
He conditioned diplomatic recognition on the behavior of African states and declared: “The 
decision which has not been taken is not ruled out in the future.”174 Although this statement 
never led to an official act of diplomatic recognition, it was regarded as highly significant by 
the Biafrans.175 France also secretly equipped the Biafran army with armaments and 
ammunition.176  
Other governments maintained their refusal to support Biafra, though many of them 
certainly felt the pressure of the lobby groups. Records of parliamentary debates reveal that 
the Biafran case has been on the agenda of the House of Commons, where the discussion was 
particularly heated,177 the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee,178 and the German 
Bundestag during summer 1968.179 The UN was reluctant to interfere. At the UN Human 
Rights Summit in Teheran in spring 1968, which was held to celebrate the International 
Human Rights Year, the Biafran issue was absent.180 In his memoirs, U Thant later clarified 
the UN position toward Biafra at the time: “Although I was deeply concerned by the 
incredible human suffering and starvation in Biafra, there was never any doubt in my mind 
that the conflict was strictly an internal matter and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the 
United Nations.”181 Throughout the conflict, the OAU refrained from interfering without 
Nigerian consent, kept its insistence on Nigeria’s territorial integrity and allowed talks only 
on humanitarian relief.182 At its annual meeting in Algiers in September 1968, the 
organization called “upon all member states of the United Nations and OAU to refrain from 
any action detrimental to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria.”183 
The Biafran conflict also had a huge impact on international relief organizations. Since 
summer, the combined operations of Oxfam, Caritas Internationalis, the World Council of 
Churches, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other humanitarian 
organizations culminated in the biggest relief operation since World War II. In many relief 
flights, the operations of the Biafran airlift managed to deliver large quantities of food and 
medicines into the enclave. Funded in large part by donations raised by the Christian churches 
and the Biafra lobby, the operation would eventually save hundreds of thousands of lives.184 
The relief organizations advocated for Biafra but carefully avoided the call for recognition. 
Instead, they displayed the matter as a purely humanitarian problem.185 
According to Akpan, without international support, “the war would have ended in 
September 1968.”186 In his Christmas Broadcast, Ojukwu praised the change in the 
international treatment of the conflict: “Whereas at this time last year we were completely 
isolated and were struggling alone in a world which seemed dead in conscience and devoid of 
any respect for human life and dignity, today not only have we friends with courage to declare 
sympathy and support for us, but also a world which has ceased to exhibit callous indifference 
to the suffering of humanity and wanton destruction of human life.”187 As a consequence of 
the airlift, however, the international debate increasingly focused on purely humanitarian 
issues. Although this move guaranteed international attention and humanitarian relief, it posed 
a severe dilemma for the secessionists. Ojukwu reflected on this dilemma in a commentary: 
“Relief, no matter how massive, is at best a palliative.”188 Thanks to the airlift, however, mass 
starvation was averted.189 




During the final months of 1968, the Biafran campaign slowly lost its momentum. In 
August 1968, the Soviet Union invaded the Czechoslovak Republic to end the Prague Spring. 
The attention of the international press quickly shifted to the events in Prague.190 
Commentators increasingly denigrated the Biafran media campaign as “propaganda.”191 To 
counter Biafran accusations, the federal government invited an international observer team to 
“investigate . . . allegations of genocide and war crimes, as they were brought to the attention 
of the observers.”192 In its first report from November 1968, the team concluded: “There is no 
evidence of any intent by the federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the 
use of the term Genocide is unwarranted.”193 Additionally, the federal government invited 
prominent Biafra supporters such as the renowned Africanist Margery Perham to visit military 
offices in Lagos and investigate the war campaign. Her observations prompted her to 
withdraw her previous genocide allegations publicly.194 In a radio broadcast, she appealed to 
Ojukwu directly and condemned him for sacrificing civilians in order to “prolong a hopeless 
struggle at their expense.”195 As a reaction to this sudden loss of credibility, the Biafran 
campaign gradually changed its strategy until spring 1969.196 
 
To Safeguard the Biafran Revolution: Spring 1969–January 1970 
From early 1969 on, the Biafran strategy incorporated a more revolutionary and 
transformative claim that referred to notions of statehood and governance. According to 
Akpan, the new approach was initially meant to appeal to the Biafran population to keep up 
the fight but quickly found its way into the international campaign.197 As Douglas Anthony 
has put it, this new approach was in part influenced by radical ideas of postcolonial self-
empowerment. The sources of inspiration included progressive thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, 
who was very popular among the student movements of 1968, and the Biafra supporter 
Nyerere, a theorist of African development.198 
In his end-of-the-year message of 1968, Ojukwu praised the “Biafran revolution” for the 
first time.199 Although the campaign still rested on a claim to self-determination and accused 
Nigeria of genocide and abuses of human rights, the focus of the new approach was 
increasingly on the achievements of the Biafran governance-building. It also included an 
original approach to postcolonial statehood by portraying the Biafran secession as an “African 
struggle against neo-colonialism”200 Ojukwu explained in an interview with Newsweek: “But 
if by Balkanization you mean division, secession inclusive, then I say to you: ‘Look at 
Europe.’ For a time, there were endless wars in Europe, incessant conflicts until the old 
Europe and empires were dismantled until the Balkans were Balkanized—then came peace. 
Why would one think that Balkanization for Europe and Biafranization for Africa would 
produce different results? I do not think it would. . .  Biafra has a message for Africa.”201 The 
Biafran struggle for independence now was portrayed as a “beacon” for Africa and its 
struggle to get rid of postcolonial influence and artificial boundaries. In a pamphlet, the 
Biafran government stated: “Support Biafra and you support African nationalism!”202 
This attempt to connect the Biafran secession to pan-African nationalism and radical 
political activism found its most sophisticated expression in Ojukwu’s Ahiara Declaration—
Principles of the Biafran Revolution. Rather than focusing on allegations of genocide, 
Ojukwu concentrated on the problem of neocolonialism. According to him, neocolonial rule 
was a problem not only for Nigeria but for all multi-ethnic states in Africa. The dominance of 
one people over another within a multiethnic state was an instrument for white domination.203 
Biafra, in contrast, was portrayed as a “movement of true and patriotic Africans.”204 The 
pamphlet dealt at length with the achievements of Biafran state-building and its 
progressiveness that amalgamated indigenous principles with modern revolutionary ideas.205 
Secession, therefore, was portrayed as a crucial act to “safeguard the Biafran revolution.”206 
In a guest contribution for the German Zeit, Biafran emissary Elizabeth Etuk stated: “The 
Biafran youth has now a new life goal: the buildup of a new society. For them, it’s not only 




sheer national self-determination. We are fighting for the ultimate liberation from colonial 
domination, against alien paternalism for the sake of economic interests. We aim to build a 
new political system that secures human lives, human rights and freedom, a system governed 
by the people’s true representatives and not ones who are bribing and manipulating in the 
name of the people.”207 Appealing to the student movement in Europe and the United States, 
the Biafran government in a press release called on “progressive youths throughout the world” 
to “rise up to the occasion and fight side by side with Biafran Freedom Fighters.”208 
Despite the insistence on revolutionary statehood, the overall political impact during the 
last year of the conflict was modest. In summer 1969, Biafran soldiers raided a Shell/BP-
operated oil field near the Nigerian town of Kwale and took eighteen European oil workers 
hostage. The Kwale incident briefly brought the conflict back on the international agenda but 
contributed to the alienation of many international supporters.209 By August 1969, significant 
Biafran attempts to exert influence at the international level largely ceased.210 Markpress 
continued its work throughout the year. 211 From January to December 1969, the agency 
published more than two hundred press releases and several books that included all essential 
speeches by Ojukwu and the Biafran government.212 Many Biafra unions carried on with 
publishing and raising funds.213 The American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive, for example, 
was at its busiest during 1969, when it opened Biafra House in New York and began issuing 
Current News from and about Biafra.214 On December 10, the anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the organization held a rally in front of the UN building to 
execute the “De-Celebration of Human Rights Day.”215 
Despite all, the Biafran military collapsed in January 1970. In the early hours of January 
11, Ojukwu fled the country.216 His successor, Philip Effiong, immediately surrendered to the 
federal army and declared the end of the Republic of Biafra.217 
 
Conclusion 
Shortly after the end of the war, U Thant declared at a press conference: “As far as the 
question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is concerned, the United 
Nations’ attitude is unequivocal. As an international organization, the United Nations has 
never accepted and does not accept, and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of 
secession of a part of its Member State.”218 
Throughout the conflict, almost all states and international bodies such as the United 
Nations and the OAU kept their preference for the preservation of Nigeria’s territorial 
integrity and respected its claim to nonintervention. Nonetheless, Biafra managed to find 
many foreign friends. The country’s rather eclectic use of national self-determination, human 
rights/genocide, and good governance was successful in persuading people, organizations, and 
even some states to support the secessionist republic. 
The Biafran strategy underwent three phases: the introduction of Biafra to an 
international audience (May 1967–spring 1968) and the portrayal of the Biafran cause as a 
fight for survival (spring 1968–spring 1969) and an act to safeguard the Biafran revolution 
(spring 1969–January 1970). The Biafran campaign made use of three international norms 
that tend to revise the territorial status quo in international politics: national self-
determination, human rights/genocide, and good governance. While the first usage rested on 
the classic reading of national self-determination as a right of a people, the notion of human 
rights and genocide prevention suggested secession as a remedy against extermination. 
Arguments that referred to governance norms highlighted the prospects of the Biafran 
secession. 
Surprisingly, for the Biafrans, national self-determination was not the most relevant 
international norm. It was used during the first phase right after the Biafrans declared their 
independence and sought to find recognition by introducing Biafra to the international 




community. As soon as the Biafran government realized that international support is badly 
needed but does not come by itself, it professionalized its efforts. The notion of national self-
determination was not compelling enough to arouse the conscience of the world, as Ojukwu 
stated in spring 1968. Accusations of human rights abuses and genocide seemed more 
dramatic because they adapted to contemporary international debates. Displaying the conflict 
as a fight for survival also had an inevitable emotional pull. Accusations of human rights 
abuses and genocide could easily be proven. The main function of national self-determination 
here was to harness notions of individual human rights and genocide prevention to justify the 
secession of Biafra. The strategy connected the domestic conflict and its consequences to 
international norm dynamics to appeal to foreign actors to live up to their commitments and 
intervene on behalf of the Biafrans. 
The attention, friendship, and sympathy the Biafrans won during summer 1968, however, 
quickly diminished as soon as doubts arose concerning the genocide accusations. The 
credibility problems prompted another strategic shift, this time toward the use of norms that 
highlighted the achievements of Biafran state-building and the international prospects of an 
independent Biafra. Here, the Biafran government sought to win international support by 
highlighting benchmarks of governance it had achieved. And rather than presenting Biafra as 
a unique case in need of urgent help, the new effort had a universal character because it 
displayed the secession as a favorable precedent for other African societies. 
Biafra used these norms (1) to put the conflict on the international agenda, (2) to frame 
the international debate in a way that it appeared necessary to intervene, and (3) to pressure 
states to do so.219 The Biafran government observed the international debate closely and 
adjusted its strategy to the international impact. Gaining international attention was a 
requirement to win external support. International norms here functioned as transmitters 
because their universal prominence made it possible to connect the conflict to world 
politics.220 Highlighting the fact that Nigeria withheld from the Biafrans the right to national 
self-determination, violated their human rights, attempted to commit genocide on them, and 
tried to halt their promising take on governance should raise international awareness. The 
effort by Markpress to secure maximum coverage shows the importance of the international 
media for the Biafran secession campaign and how beneficial agenda setting is for 
secessionists. A comprehensive framing of the Biafran cause as a fight for self-determination, 
survival, or revolution steered the international debate and suggested support or diplomatic 
recognition as the only meaningful reaction. During summer 1968, the conflict received much 
international attention, and most observers adopted the Biafran narrative. 
Political pressure, in turn, could be realized only indirectly, through a support network of 
friends of Biafra that came into existence in summer 1968. Civil society organizations that 
were concerned with the Biafran cause used the Biafran wordings as rhetorical ammunition 
and connected the Biafran struggle to contemporary domestic discourses. By reminding 
governments of their international commitments, civil society organizations sought to 
pressure politicians to support Biafra. National self-determination, human rights/genocide, 
and good governance here served as transmitters between the secession conflict and internal 
debates in the target societies. 
As we have seen, the Biafran government was busy expressing its gratitude toward the 
foreign “friends of Biafra” and echoed statements that were either favorable toward secession 
or in line with the Biafran narrative. The Biafrans ached for every subtle sign of international 
acknowledgment and much appreciated it. In a sense, such accomplishments meant some 
“upgrading,” because it confirmed that Biafra was an international actor and capable of 
entering into foreign relations. From the beginning, Biafra acted as if it were a sovereign state. 
International and domestic strategies interlocked. At times, as Ojuwku stated, the priority of 
the Biafran grand strategy was winning international support. The war efforts had the 
objective to stop the Nigerian advance long enough to allow the Biafrans to win substantial 




international assistance. Throughout the conflict, the Biafrans called for almost all possible 
variants of international support, such as humanitarian relief, diplomatic leverage, political 
advocacy, material aid, military intervention, and premature recognition. International support 
had immediate and tangible effects. International friendship mattered a lot to the Biafrans, 
because it secured comprehensive aid that saved millions of lives, diplomatic backing, and 
secret arms deliveries that enabled the Biafran military to hold the line for a substantial 
period. Additionally, foreign assistance helped to amplify the secessionist media campaign. 
This observation is consistent with Coggins’s concept of an incremental and dynamic spread 
of international support.221 For some time, Biafra could control this momentum and use 
international support in its attempt to find more external assistance. International support, 
therefore, legitimized the Biafran cause. 
This observation is proof of the agency secession movements can erect by pursuing 
normative politics. The Biafrans not only attempted to manage the international legitimacy of 
their cause. They also tried to delegitimize the federal government by accusing it of the abuse 
of human rights and the intention to commit genocide. On one hand, the oughtness and sense 
of moral duty that is characteristic of both norms played an exceptional role. On the other 
hand, as we have seen, acquiring international legitimacy is not a simple matter. The Biafrans 
had to deal with ignorance, reservations, criticism, and setbacks. Winning the sympathy of 
domestic societies did not mean that the respective governments would support Biafra. It 
became apparent also that secession movements compete with the metropole in their quest to 
become legitimized by foreign actors. 
By using international norms, secession movements can win substantial international 
support and, as a consequence, achieve great success despite their domestic inferiority. The 
media, civil society, and the public are important arenas for secessionist norm politics. 
Although claiming them is difficult, international norms are more than mere political rhetoric. 
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